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Abstinence with Reputation Loss, Understating Expectations and Guilt  
and the Effectiveness of Emission Tax 
 
Amnon Levy 
School of Economics 
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Australia 
 
 
Abstract 
The responsibility for, and consequences of, greenhouse gas emissions are shared by all 
countries, but only a few are willing to tax emissions. The paper argues that the reactions of 
the abstaining countries are crucial for assessing the effectiveness of the tax. The paper 
analyzes an interaction between a tax-collecting and investing coalition of rich countries, 
abstaining rich countries and poor countries. The non-coalition countries might have loss of 
reputation and guilt and overstate the tax’s emission-moderating effect. As long as these three 
types of countries react to their counterparts’ emissions, taxing emissions does not 
necessarily reduce the global emissions. (JEL Q52) 
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1. Introduction 
Price incentives for dealing with greenhouse gas emissions have been argued to be efficient 
and leading to outcomes with greater welfare than quantity controls (Pizer, 2002; Hoel and 
Karp, 2002; Newell and Pizer, 2003; Fischer and Newell, 2008). The advocates of emission 
tax expect the tax to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by increasing efficiency in carbon-
fuels’ use and encouraging and financing the development and adoption of cleaner sources of 
energies and technologies. While responsibility for, and consequences of, greenhouse gas 
emissions are shared by all countries, only a few are willing to tax emissions. The paper 
argues that the reactions of the unwilling countries to the expected emissions of the willing 
countries are crucial for assessing the effectiveness of this price incentive.  
The analysis leading to the said conclusion is based on a framework that allows an 
emission-tax-charging coalition of environmentally concerned rich countries to be formed. 
The coalition taxes members’ emissions and generates a positive common-pool externality 
for members by concertedly investing the tax revenues in improving the use of carbon-fuels 
and developing and adopting low-emission energy sources and technologies. The abstaining 
less concerned rich countries incur international reputation and political loss for per capita 
emissions beyond the coalition’s level. Poor countries do not incur such loss due to their low 
per capita emissions or, otherwise, forgiven due to their low per capita income. The positive 
common-pool externality and the international reputation and political loss increase the 
propensity of the environmentally more concerned rich countries to stay in the coalition.  
With this framework in mind, the equilibrium per capita emissions of the coalition-
countries, abstaining rich countries and poor countries are derived. The computation of the 
equilibrium emissions takes into account that some of the expectations of the three types of 
countries about each other’s emissions can be understated due to a possible excessive 
impression created by the coalition’s environmental initiatives. The computation also takes 
into account a possible guilt effect on the abstaining countries’ concerns for the environment. 
The computed equilibrium reveals that as long as the three types of countries react to 
their counterparts’ emissions, taxing emissions and investing the tax revenues in development 
and adoption of cleaner energy sources and technologies would not necessarily reduce the 
global emissions, nor the coalition’s emissions. This conclusion also holds under accurate 
expectations and absence of guilt in the abstaining countries. The analysis of the equilibrium 
identifies the conditions under which the unilateral implementation of the emission tax by the 
coalition decreases the coalition’s and global emissions.  
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2. Framework 
Suppose that the world has rN  rich countries divided into two distinct groups by their degree 
of concern about the state of the world’s environment. Those with the higher degree of 
concern (denoted by subscript rc), rcN  in number, form an emission-tax collecting and 
investing coalition. The other r rcN N−  rich countries with the lower degree of concern 
(denoted by subscript ra), abstain. The population of each of the coalition countries is rcP and 
the population of each of the abstaining rich countries is raP . The poor countries (denoted by 
subscript p) are pN  in number. They have the same size of population, pP , and the same 
degree of concern about the state of the world’s environment. The three types of countries 
produce the same composite good, but with different technologies and levels of emission per 
unit.  
With pq  indicating the emissions released by the production process of the 
representative resident of the poor countries and 0α >  the ratio of his output to emissions, 
the per capita output and also (with income-tax revenues being redistributed) disposable 
income in the poor countries is: 
d
p py q= α .            (1) 
Before the formation of the emission-tax collecting and investing coalition, all the rN  
rich countries have shared a technology that was cleaner than that of the poor countries. This 
technology prevails in the abstaining rich countries. With raq  indicating the emissions 
released by the production process of the representative resident of the abstaining rich 
countries and 0η>  the difference in the output-emission ratio between the abstaining rich 
countries and the poor countries, the per capita output and also disposable income in the 
abstaining rich countries is: 
d
ra ray ( )q= α +η .           (2) 
With rcq  indicating the emissions released by the production process of the 
representative resident of the coalition’s rich countries, 0τ >  the emission-tax rate on 
domestic emissions set by the coalition, and 0β >  the marginal return on the aggregate 
emission-tax revenues rc rc rc( q N P )τ  invested concertedly by the coalition in development and 
adoption of cleaner energy sources and technologies, the per capita disposable income in the 
coalition countries is: 
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d
rc rc rc rc rcy [( ) ( N P q ) ]q= α +η +β τ − τ .         (3) 
The term rc rc rc( N P q )β τ  displays a positive common-pool externality. In addition to a greater 
concern about the environment and a potential international reputation and political loss, 
access to the cleaner energy sources and technologies developed by the concerted investment 
of the aggregate emission-tax revenues provides an incentive for each of the rcN  coalition 
countries to cooperate.  
With 0E  denoting the initial state of the global environment, eg 0>  the global 
environment’s natural regeneration rate and 0δ >  the adverse effect of deviation from zero 
emissions on the global environment (footprint coefficient), the change in the global 
environment is: 
2
e 0 p p p rc rc rc ra r rc raE g E [q N P q N P q (N N )P ]Δ = −δ + + − .     (4) 
Each type of country, i p, ra, rc= , gains utility from its per capita disposable income, diy , at a 
rate i 0γ > , which represents the (constant, for simplicity) marginal utility from disposable 
income. It also gains utility from environmental improvement ( E 0Δ > ) and loses utility from 
environmental deterioration ( E 0Δ < ) at a rate i 0φ >  that reflects its degree of concern about 
changes in the environment. Recalling the aforementioned concern-differential between the 
two types of rich countries, rc raφ > φ . The ‘environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis’ (Selden 
and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995) and the ‘affluence hypothesis’ (Diekmann 
and Franzen, 1999; Franzen, 2003) suggest that ra pφ > φ . The per capita utility in an 
abstaining rich country is further diminished by international reputation and political loss 
from exceeding the coalition’s per capita emission. This loss is intensified by the 
exceptionality of the rich country’s abstinence and by the power of the coalition, which are 
reflected by rc rc r rc raN P / [(N N )P ]− . With the scalar ψ  (positive and proportional to 
rc rc r rc raN P / [(N N )P ]−  when ra rcq q 0− >  and zero otherwise) denoting the international 
reputation and political loss coefficient: 
d
i i i
i d 2
i i i ra rc
y E for i p, rc
u
y E (q q ) for i ra.
⎧γ + φ Δ =⎪= ⎨
γ + φ Δ −ψ − =⎪⎩
       (5) 
In view of (1)-(5), the utilities of the representative agents of the three types of 
countries are: 
2
p p p p e 0 p p p rc rc rc ra r rc rau q {g E [q N P q N P q (N N )P ] }= γ α + φ −δ + + −      (6) 
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2
rc rc rc rc rc rc rc e 0 p p p rc rc rc ra r rc rau [( ) ( N P q ) ]q {g E [q N P q N P q (N N )P ] }= γ α +η +β τ − τ +φ −δ + + −  (7) 
2 2
ra ra ra ra e 0 p p p rc rc rc ra r rc ra ra rcu ( )q {g E [q N P q N P q (N N )P ] } (q q )= γ α+η +φ −δ + + − −ψ − .   (8) 
In each of the three types of countries, per capita emission is set at a level that maximizes the 
representative agent’s utility, given the expectations about the foreign counterparts’ 
emissions. 
 
3. Reactions to counterparts’ emissions 
The reaction function of the utility-maximizing representative agent living in a poor country 
to the expected emissions (denoted by the superscript e/p) of the agents living in the 
coalition’s rich countries and the abstaining rich countries is: 
p e/p e/prc rc r rc ra
p rc ra2
p p p p p p p
N P (N N )Pq q q
2 (N P ) N P N P
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ α −
= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟φ δ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
.                  (9) 
The representative agent of a poor country reduces (increases) his emissions when a rise 
(decline) in his richer counterparts’ emissions is expected, proportionally to their relative 
population size. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (9) indicates the poor 
countries’ optimal per capita emission in the absence of emissions from other sources.     
The reaction function of the utility-maximizing representative agent living in a 
coalition country to the expected emissions (denoted by the superscript e/rc) of the agents 
living in the non-coalition rich countries and the poor countries is: 
rc p p e/rc e/ rcrc rc r rc ra
rc p ra
rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc
N P( ) (N N )Pq q q
2[ N P ]N P N P N P
φ δ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ α + η− τ φ δ −
= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟φ δ −βτ φ δ −βτ φ δ −βτ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
.             (10) 
Noting that by the second-order condition for maximum rc rc rcN P 0φ δ −βτ > , the 
representative agent of a coalition country reduces (increases) his emissions when a rise 
(decline) in his poor and abstaining-rich counterparts’ emissions is expected. His reaction is 
intensified by his counterparts’ relative population size and by the return on the investment of 
the emission-tax in developing and adopting cleaner energy sources and technologies. The 
first term on the right-hand side of equation (10) indicates the coalition’s optimal per capita 
emission in the absence of emissions from the abstaining countries.     
The reaction function of an agent living in an abstaining rich country to the expected 
emissions (denoted by the superscript e/ra) of the agents living in the coalition’s rich 
countries and poor countries is: 
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ra
ra 2 2
ra r rc ra
ra p p r rc r e/ ra e/rara rc rc r rc ra
p rc2 2 2 2
ra r rc ra ra r rc ra
0.5 ( )q
[ (N N ) P ]
N P (N N )P [ N P (N N )P ]q q .
[ (N N ) P ] [ (N N ) P ]
γ α + η
=
φ δ − +ψ
φ δ − φ δ − −ψ
− −
φ δ − +ψ φ δ − +ψ
                (11) 
The representative agent of an abstaining rich country reduces (increases) his emissions when 
a rise (decline) in his poorer counterparts’ emissions is expected. His reaction is intensified 
by the poorer population’s relative size. If ra rc rc r rc raN P (N N )Pφ δ − > ψ , he also reduces 
(increases) his emissions when a rise (decline) in the coalition’s per capita emissions is 
expected. His reactions are moderated by his marginal international reputation and political 
loss, ψ , engendered by a deviation from the coalition’s per capita emission. The first term on 
the right-hand side of equation (11) indicates the abstaining rich countries’ optimal per capita 
emission in the absence of emissions from other sources. 
 
4. Inaccurate expectations, guilt and equilibrium emissions 
In computing the equilibrium emissions (denoted by asterisk), let us assume that some of the 
expectations of the three types of countries about each-other’s emissions are not necessarily 
accurate. It is possible that, being impressed by the coalition’s environmental initiatives, the 
abstaining countries overstate the emission-moderating effect of the emission tax and hence 
understate the per capita emissions of the coalition. By the same rationale it is further 
possible that the higher the tax rate is the stronger the abstaining countries’ impression and, 
consequently, understatement of the coalition’s actual emission. With ra ( ) 0ε τ ≥  and p ( ) 0ε τ ≥  
indicating the expectation errors of the abstaining rich countries and the poor countries, 
respectively, and with gradients ra ( ) 0′ε τ ≥  and p ( ) 0′ε τ ≥ , let us consider the case where 
e/rc *
ra raq q= , 
e/rc *
p pq q= , 
e/ra *
p pq q=  and 
e/p *
ra raq q= , 
e/ra *
rc rc raq q ( )= − ε τ  and  
e/p *
rc rc pq q ( )= − ε τ . It can 
be expected that the abstaining countries’ understatement of the coalition’s emissions 
contributes to global emissions.  
 On the other hand, it is possible that the coalition’s environmental initiatives intensify 
the abstaining countries’ sense of guilt and moderates their free-riding. It is further possible 
that the higher the coalition’s emission tax is the stronger the guilt sensed by the abstaining 
countries. Their intensified sense of guilt can be manifested in increased concerns about the 
environment: ra ( ) 0′φ τ ≥  and p ( ) 0′φ τ ≥  with zero-gradient indicating guilt-insensitivity.   
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The incorporation of the said expectations and possible concern-intensifying guilt into 
the reaction equations (9)-(11) leads to: 
 
p* * *rc rc r rc ra
p rc p ra2
p p p p p p p
N P (N N )Pq [q ( )] q
2 ( ) (N P ) N P N P
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ α −
= − − ε τ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟φ τ δ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
             (12) 
rc p p* * *rc rc r rc ra
rc p ra
rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc rc
N P( ) (N N )Pq q q
2[ N P ]N P N P N P
φ δ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ α + η− τ φ δ −
= − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟φ δ −βτ φ δ −βτ φ δ −βτ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
            (13) 
 
* ra
ra 2 2
ra r rc ra
ra p p r rc r * *ra rc rc r rc ra
p rc ra2 2 2 2
ra r rc ra ra r rc ra
0.5 ( )q
[ ( ) (N N ) P ]
( ) N P (N N )P [ ( ) N P (N N )P ]q [q ( )].
[ ( ) (N N ) P ] [ ( ) (N N ) P ]
γ α + η
=
φ τ δ − +ψ
φ τ δ − φ τ δ − −ψ
− − − ε τ
φ τ δ − +ψ φ τ δ − +ψ
         (14) 
 
In turn, the equilibrium emissions are:1  
rc p p* rc
rc rc p p p
p p rc rc
[ / ( )] ( )1q 2 N P ( )
2 N P N P
⎡ ⎤φ φ τ γ α⎛ ⎞ γ α + η− τ
= − + φ δ ε τ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟βτ⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                    (15) 
* *
ra rc ra
ra r rc ra p
ra ra rc rc r rc ra ra p
p p p
q q ( )
( )(N N )P1 ( ) 2 ( ) N P (N N )P [ ( ) ( )]
2 ( )N P
= −ε τ
⎡ ⎤φ τ − γ α
+ γ α +η − + φ τ δ − ε τ − ε τ⎢ ⎥
ψ φ τ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
        
(16) 
p* rc rc r rc ra
p p ra2
p p p p p p p
ra r rc ra pr rc ra
ra ra rc rc r rc ra ra p
p p p p p
rc
N P (N N )Pq ( ) ( )
2 ( ) (N P ) N P N P
( )(N N )P(N N )P 1 ( ) 2 ( ) N P (N N )P [ ( ) ( ) ]
N P 2 ( )N P
N
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞γ α −
= + ε τ + ε τ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟φ τ δ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤φ τ − γ α−
− γ α+η − + φ τ δ − ε τ −ε τ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ψ φ τ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
− *rc r rc ra rc
p p
P (N N )P q .
N P
⎛ ⎞+ −
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
  (17) 
The equilibrium global emissions are: 
p* * * *
rc rc rc r rc ra ra p p p rc rc p
p p p
Q N P q (N N )P q N P q N P ( )
2 ( ) N P
γ α
≡ + − + = + ε τ
φ τ δ
.            (18) 
If entree to, and exit from, the coalition are free and motivated by utility gains, the emission-
tax rate that ensures the stability of rcN strong coalition is a τ̂  maintaining equality between 
                                                            
1 Equations (15) and (16) are obtained by substituting the right-hand side of (12) into (13) and (14), respectively, 
and rearranging and collecting terms. Equation (17) is obtained by substituting the right-hand side of equation 
(16) into equation (12) 
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the utility of the residents of the coalition and the utility of residents of the abstaining rich 
countries with equilibrium emissions. 
5. Conclusion  
The equilibrium indicated in (15)-(18) leads to the following propositions and concluding 
remarks. 
 
Proposition 1: If rc p p p p p p rc p p p{[ / ( )] [1 ( ) / ( )] / (N P ) 2 N P ( )}′φ φ τ γ α + τφ τ φ τ + φ δ ε τ  is larger 
(smaller) than rc rc rc rc p p p[ ( ) / (N P ) 2 N P ( ) ]′γ α +η + φ δ ε τ τ ,  then a unilateral implementation of 
emission tax and a concerted green investment of the tax revenues by a coalition of rich 
countries reduce (increase) the coalition’s per capita emissions. (See Appendix for a proof.) 
 
The effectiveness of the tax in reducing the coalition’s emissions increases with the poor 
countries’ sense of guilt, but diminishes with the poor countries inclination to overstate the 
moderating effect of tax on the coalition’s emissions.  
  
Proposition 2: If ra ra rc rc r rc ra ra p( ) 2 ( ) N P (N N )P [ ( ) ( )]γ α + η + φ τ δ − ε τ − ε τ  is greater (smaller) 
than r rc ra p p ra p p ra[(N N )P / (N P )][ ( ) / ( )] 2 ( )− φ τ φ τ γ α + ψε τ , then the per capita  emission of the 
abstaining rich countries is larger (smaller) than the per capita emission in the emission tax 
collecting and investing coalition.  (Straightforward from equation (16)) 
 
The possibility of a positive per capita emission differential between the abstaining rich 
countries and the coalition increases with the abstaining rich countries’ utility from the output 
facilitated by a unit of emission. It also increases with the coalition-emission’s 
understatement differential between the abstaining rich countries and the poor countries, 
amplified by the footprint coefficient, by the abstaining rich countries’ population and degree 
of concern for the environment and by the coalition’s population. This possibility diminishes 
with the abstaining countries’ loss of international reputation stemming from understating the 
coalition’s per capita emission. It also diminishes with the poor-countries’ utility from the 
output facilitated by a unit of emission, weighted by the abstaining rich countries’ relative 
population and degree of concern about the environment.    
 
Proposition 3: If  
2
p p p p rc rc
p p
( ) 2 ( ) N P N P
( )
>
<
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤′φ τ φ τ δ
⎢ ⎥=⎢ ⎥
′ε τ γ α⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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then the global emissions are reduced, not affected, or increased by the emission-tax set by 
the coalition. (See Appendix for a proof.) 
 
This proposition indicates the critical ratio of the poor-countries’ guilt-sensitivity to their 
inclination to overstate the effect of emission-tax above which the implementation of 
emission-tax by the coalition leads to reduction of global emissions. Equation (18) further 
reveals that when the poor countries do not overstate the emission tax’s effect on the 
coalition’s emissions and do not feel guilty about abstaining, the level of the global emissions 
is not affected by the emission-tax rate set by the coalition.    
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: From (12), 
*
rc p p rc p p prc rc
2
rc rc p p p
rc p prc
rc p p p2
rc rc p p
rc p prc
rc p p p2
rc rc p p
( ) 2 N P ( )q
2 N P 2 ( ) N P 2
[ / ( )]( )1 2 N P ( )
2 N P N P
[ / ( )]( ) 11 2 N P ( )
2 N P 2 N P
′ ′φ γ αφ τ φ δ ε τ∂ γ
= − +
∂τ βτ βτφ τ βτ
⎛ ⎞φ φ τ γ αγ α +η− τ
+ − − φ δ ε τ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟βτ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ φ φ τ γ αγ α +η− τ⎛ ⎞= + − + φ δ ε τ⎜⎜ ⎟βτ τ βτ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
rc p p rc p p p
2
p p p
rc p p p prc
rc p p p p2
rc rc p p
( ) 2 N P ( )
2 ( ) N P 2
[ / ( )] [1 ( ) / ( )]( )1 2 N P [ ( ) ( ) ] .
2 N P N P
⎞
⎟⎜ ⎟
⎠
′ ′φ γ αφ τ φ δ ε τ
− +
βτφ τ βτ
⎡ ⎤′φ φ τ γ α + τφ τ φ τγ α +η ′= − − φ δ ε τ − ε τ τ⎢ ⎥
βτ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The equilibrium global emissions are: 
* * * *
rc rc rc r rc ra ra p p pQ N P q (N N )P q N P q≡ + − + . 
Recalling (15), (16) and (17), 
p*
rc rc p
p p p
Q N P ( )
2 ( ) N P
γ α
= + ε τ
φ τ δ
 
Hence, 
2*
p p p p rc rc
p p
( ) 2 ( ) N P N PQ 0 as .
( )
< >
> <
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤′φ τ φ τ δ∂
⎢ ⎥= =⎢ ⎥
′∂τ ε τ γ α⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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